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XXIV. *On the Philosophy of the Hindus. Part III.* By HENRY THOMAS
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Read March 4, 1826.

INTRODUCTION.

OF the six systems of philosophy received among learned Hindus, four have been noticed in the preceding parts of this essay, *viz.* the theistical and atheistical *Sānc'hya*s, the dialectic *Nyāya*, and the atomical *Vaiśēshika*. The prior or practical *Mīmāṃsā* will be now considered; reserving the later or theological *Mīmāṃsā*, usually named *Védānta*, for a future disquisition, should it appear requisite to pursue the subject, much concerning it being already before the public.

The object of the *Mīmāṃsā* is the interpretation of the *vēdas*. “Its purpose,” says a commentator,* “is to determine the sense of revelation.” Its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty. Here *duty* intends sacrifices and other acts of religion ordained by the *vēdas*. The same term (*dharma*) likewise signifies *virtue*, or moral merit; and grammarians have distinguished its import according to the gender of the noun. In one (the masculine), it implies virtue; in the other (neuter), it means an act of devotion.† It is in the last-mentioned sense that the term is here employed; and its meaning is by commentators explained to be “the scope of an injunction; the object of a command;‡ a purpose ordained by revelation with a view to a motive, such as sacrifice commanded by the *vēdas*, for the attainment of bliss;”§ and such indeed is the main scope of every disquisition.

The prior (*pūrva*) *Mīmāṃsā* then is *practical*, as relating to works (*carma*) or religious observances to be undertaken for specific ends; and it is accordingly termed *carma-mīmāṃsā*, in contradistinction to the theological, which is named *Brahme-mīmāṃsā*.

It is not directly a system of philosophy; nor chiefly so. But, in course

* *Sōmanāt'ha* in the *Mayūc'ha*, 2. 1. 17.

† *Mēdinī cōsha*.

‡ *Pāṛi'ha*, 1. 1. 2. *Didh.* *ibid.*

§ *Apadēva*; *Nyāya-pracāsa*.

of delivering canons of scriptural interpretation, it incidently touches upon philosophical topics; and scholastic disputants have elicited from its dogmas, principles of reasoning applicable to the prevailing points of controversy agitated in the Hindu schools of philosophy.

Writers on the Mīmāṃsā.

The acknowledged founder of this school of scriptural interpretation is JAIMINI. He is repeatedly named as an authority in the *Sūtras* which are ascribed to him. Other ancient writers on the same subject, who are occasionally quoted in those aphorisms, as *Atréya*, *Bádari*, *Bádaráyaṇ'a*,* *Lábucáyana*, *Aitisáyana*, &c. are sometimes adduced there for authority, but oftener for correction and confutation.

It is no doubt possible, that the true author of a work may speak in it of himself by name, and in the third person. Nor, indeed, is that very unusual. A Hindu commentator will, however, say, as the scholiasts of *Menu's* and of *Yājñyavalkya's* institutes of law do, that the oral instructions of the teacher were put in writing by some disciple; and, for this reason, the mention of him as of a third person is strictly proper.

The *sūtras*, or aphorisms, thus attributed to JAIMINI, are arranged in twelve lectures, each subdivided into four chapters, except the third, sixth, and tenth lectures, which contain twice as many; making the entire number sixty chapters. These again are divided into sections, cases, or topics (*adhicaráṇas*), ordinarily comprising several *sūtras*, but not uncommonly restricted to one; and instances may be noted where a single sentence is split into several *adhicaráṇas*; or, on the contrary, a single phrase variously interpreted becomes applicable to distinct cases; and *sūtras*, united under the same head by one interpreter, are by another explained as constituting separate topics. The total number of *sūtras* is 2,652, and of *adhicaráṇas* 915, as numbered by MÁD'HAVA ÁCHÁRYA.

Like the aphorisms of other Indian sciences, those *sūtras* are extremely obscure; or without a gloss utterly unintelligible. They must have been from the first accompanied by an oral or written exposition; and an ancient scholiast (*Vṛtticára*), is quoted by the herd of commentators for subsidiary aphorisms, supplying the defect of the text, as well as for explanatory comments on it.

* Author of the *Brahme-sūtras*.

Besides the work of the old scholiast, which probably is not extant in a complete form, the *sútras* have, as usual, been elucidated by a perpetual commentary, and by corrective annotations on it.

The author of the extant commentary is ŚĀBARA SWÁMÍ BHĀṬŪ, from whom it takes the name of *Śābara bhāṣya*. He quotes occasionally the ancient scholiast, sometimes concurring with, sometimes dissenting from him.

The annotations (*vārtica*) are by BHĀṬŪ CUMĀRILA SWÁMÍ, who is the great authority of the *Mīmāṃsaka* school, in which he is emphatically designated by his title, *Bhāṭṭa*, equivalent to Doctor. He frequently expounds and corrects ŚĀBARA's gloss, often delivers a different interpretation, but in many instances passes entire sections without notice, as seeing no occasion for emendation or explanation of the commentary, which he must be considered therefore as tacitly ratifying. The ancient scholiast is sometimes cited by him, adopting or amending the scholia; and he criticises the text itself, and arrangement of JAIMINI.

Next to him in celebrity is a writer usually cited under the title of *Guru*; more rarely under the designation of *Prābhācāra*.* His work I have had no opportunity of examining with a view to the present essay, and he is known to me chiefly from references and quotations; as in MĀDHAVA's summary, where his opinions are perpetually contrasted with CUMĀRILA's; and in the text and commentary of the *Śāstra-Dīpikā*, where his positions are canvassed and compared with those of numerous other writers.

CUMĀRILA BHĀṬŪ figures greatly in the traditionary religious history of India. He was predecessor of ŚĀNCARA ĀCHĀRYA, and equally rigid in maintaining the orthodox faith against heretics, who reject the authority of the *védas*. He is considered to have been the chief antagonist of the sect of *Buddha*, and to have instigated an exterminating persecution of that heresy.† He does, indeed, take every occasion of controverting the authority and doctrine of ŚĀCYA or BUDDHA, as well as ARHAT or JINA, together with obscurer heretics, BÓD'HĀYANA and MAŚACA; and he denies them any consideration, even when they do concur upon any point with the *védas*.‡ The age of CUMĀRILA, anterior to ŚĀNCARA,§ and corresponding with the period of the persecution of the *Bauddhas*, goes back to an antiquity of

* *Mādh.* 1. 1. 3. † Preface to Wilson's Dictionary, p. xix. ‡ *Mīm.* 1. 3. 4. § See Note A.

much more than a thousand years. He is reputed to have been contemporary with SUDHANWA, but the chronology of that prince's reign is not accurately determined.*

Next in eminence among the commentators of the *Mīmāṃsā* is PĀR'THA-SĀRAT'HI MISRA, who has professedly followed the guidance of CUMĀRILA BHAT'TA. His commentary, entitled *Śāstra-dīpicā*, has been amply expounded in a gloss bearing the title of *Mayūc'ha-mālā*, by SÓMANĀT'HA, a *Cárnátacī Bráhmaṇ*, whose elder brother was high priest of the celebrated temple at *Vēncatádri* (or *Vēncatagiri*).† PĀR'THA-SĀRAT'HI is author likewise of the *Nyāya-ratna-mālā* and other known works.

A compendious gloss on the text of JAIMINI, following likewise the same guidance (that of CUMĀRILA) is the *Bhaṭṭa-dīpicā* of C'HANDA-DĒVA, author of a separate and ampler treatise, entitled *Mīmāṃsā-caustubha*, to which he repeatedly refers for a fuller elucidation of matters briefly touched upon in his concise but instructive gloss. This work is posterior to that of MÁDHAVA ÁCHÁRYA, who is sometimes quoted in it, and to PĀR'THA-SĀRAT'HI, who is more frequently noticed.

The *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-vivēca* is another commentary by a distinguished author, BHAVANĀT'HA MISRA. I speak of this and of the foregoing as commentaries, because they follow the order of the text, recite one or more of the aphorisms from every section, and explain the subject, but without regularly expounding every word, as ordinary scholiasts, in a perpetual gloss.

Among numerous other commentaries on JAIMINI's text, the *Nyāyavālidīdhi* of RĀGHAVĀNANDA is not to be omitted. It contains an excellent interpretation of the *sūtras*, which it expounds word by word, in the manner of a perpetual comment. It is brief, but clear; leaving nothing unexplained, and wandering into no digressions.

It results from the many revisions which the text and exposition of it have undergone, with amendments, one while arriving by a different process of reasoning at the same conclusion, another time varying the question and deducing from an unchanged text an altered argument for its solution, that the cases (*adhicaraanās*) assume a very diversified aspect in the hands of the many interpreters of the *Mīmāṃsā*.

A summary or paraphrase of JAIMINI's doctrine was put into verse by an

* Preface to Wilson's Dictionary, p. xviii.

† 135 miles west from Madras.

ancient author, whose memorial verses are frequently cited by the commentators of JAIMINI, under the title of *Sangraha*.

Another metrical paraphrase is largely employed in the *Vártica*, or is a part of that work itself. An entire chapter occurs under the title of *Ślóca vártica* : other whole chapters of CUMÁRILA's performance are exclusively in prose. In many, verse and prose are intermixed.

The most approved introduction to the study of the *Mīmāṃsā* is the *Nyāya-mālā-vistara* by MÁDHAVA ÁCHÁRYA. It is in verse, attended with a commentary in prose by the same author. It follows the order of JAIMINI's text ; not by way of paraphrase, but as a summary (though the title rather implies amplification) of its purport, and of approved deductions from it ; sometimes explaining separately the doctrine of *Bhaṭṭa* and of *Guru*, under each head ; at other times that of the old scholiast ; but more commonly confined to that of *Bhaṭṭa* alone ; yet often furnishing more than one application for the same text, as *Bhaṭṭa* himself does.

MÁDHAVA ÁCHÁRYA was both priest and minister, or civil as well as spiritual adviser of BUCCA-RÁYA and HARIHARA, sovereigns of *Vidyánagara* on the *Gódavari*, as his father MÁYANA had been of their father and predecessor SANGAMA, who reigned over the whole peninsula of India.

Like the numerous other writings which bear his name, the *Nyāya-mālā* was composed, not by himself, but by his directions, under the more immediate superintendence of his brother, SÁYANA-ÁCHÁRYA ; and it appears from its preface to have been the next performance undertaken after the completion of their commentary on PÁRÁSARA's institutes of law ; and it suitably enough preceded the great commentary of the same authors on the whole of the *védas*.

According to history, confirmed by authentic inscriptions, MÁDHAVA flourished towards the middle of the fourteenth century : the sovereigns, whose confidence he enjoyed, reigned from that time to the end of the century.

Analysis of the Mīmāṃsā.

From this brief notice of the principal writers on the *Mīmāṃsā*, I pass to the subject which has occupied them.

A complete *adhicaráṇa*, or case, consists of five members, *viz.* 1, the subject, or matter to be explained ; 2, the doubt, or question arising upon that matter ; 3, the first side (*pūrva-pacsha*) or *primá facie* argument con-

cerning it; 4, the answer (*uttara*) or demonstrated conclusion (*siddhānta*); 5, the pertinence or relevancy.

The last-mentioned appertains to the whole arrangement as well as to its subdivisions; and commentators are occupied with showing the relation and connexion of subjects treated in the several lectures and chapters, and their right distribution and appropriate positions.

The text of JAIMIT'S aphorisms does not ordinarily exhibit the whole of the five members of an *adhicaraṇa*. Frequently the subject, and the question concerning it, are but hinted, or they are left to be surmised; sometimes the disputable solution of it is unnoticed, and the right conclusion alone is set forth. The rest is supplied by the scholiasts; and they do not always concur as to the most apposite examples, nor concerning the presumed allusions of the text.

Its introductory *sūtras* propose the subject in this manner. "Now then the study of duty is to be commenced. Duty is a purpose which is inculcated by a command. Its reason must be inquired."*

That is, according to the interpretation of commentators, 'Next, after reading the *vēda*; and therefore, for the sake of understanding it; the duty enjoined by it is to be investigated. Duty is a meaning deduced from injunction: its ground must be sifted. A command is not implicitly received for proof of duty.'

The business of the *Mīmāṃsā*, then, being to investigate what is incumbent as a duty to be performed, the primary matter for inquiry is proof and authority (*pramāṇa*). This, accordingly, is the subject of the first lecture, comprising four chapters, which treat of the following matters: 1st, precept and its cogency; 2, affirmation or narrative (*art'havāda*), as well as prayer and invocation (*mantra*), their cogency as inculcating some duty; 3, law memorial (*smṛiti*), and usage (*āchāra*), their authority as presumption of some cogent revelation; 4, modifying ordinance and specific denomination, distinguished from direct or positive injunction.

Proceeding with the subject as above proposed, the *Mīmāṃsā* declare that perception or simple apprehension is no reason of duty, for it apprehends a present object only, whereas duty concerns the future.† Simple

* *Jaim.* 1. 1. 1—3.

† *Jaim.* 1. 1. 4.

apprehension is defined in these words: "when the organs of man are in contiguity with an object, that source of knowledge is *perception*."

The ancient scholiast has here introduced definitions of other sources of knowledge which the author had omitted, viz., inference, verbal communication, comparison, presumption, and privation. None of these are reasons of duty except verbal communication; for the rest are founded on perception, which itself is not so. Verbal communication is either human, as a correct sentence (*ápta-vácyá*), or superhuman, as a passage of the *védas*. It is indicative or imperative; and the latter is either positive or relative: Ex. 1. "This is to be done:" 2. "That is to be done like this."

"On sight of one member of a known association, the consequent apprehension of the other part which is not actually proximate, is (*anumāna*) inference.* The association must be such as had been before directly perceived, or had become known by analogy.

"Comparison (*upamāna*) is knowledge arising from resemblance more or less strong. It is apprehension of the likeness which a thing presently seen bears to one before observed: and likeness or similitude is concomitancy of associates or attributes with one object, which were associated with another.

"Presumption (*ar'bhāpatti*) is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived, but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard, or proven.

"Knowledge of a thing which is not proximate (or subject to perception) derived through understood sound, that is through words the acceptance whereof is known, is (*śástra*) ordinance or revelation. It is (*śabda*) verbal communication."

These five sources of knowledge, or modes of proof, as here defined, are admitted by all *Mīmānsacas*: and the followers of PRABHÁCARA are stated to restrict their admission to those five.† *Bhāṭṭa* with his disciples, guided by the ancient scholiast, adds a sixth, which is privation (*abháva*); and the *Védántis* or *Uttara Mīmānsacas* concur in the admission of that number.

The *Chárvácas*, as noticed in the first part of this essay,‡ recognise but one, viz., perception. The followers of CANÁDE and those of *Sugata* (*Buddha*) acknowledge two, perception and inference. The *Sānc'hya*s reckon three,

* Anc. Schol. *Dīdh. Párt'h.*, &c.

† *Védánta-sic'hāmani*.

‡ Page 28.

including affirmation.* The *Naiyáyas*, or followers of GÓTAMA, count four, *viz.*, the foregoing together with comparison. The *Prábhácaras*, as just now observed, admit five. And the rest of the *Mímánsacas*, in both schools, prior and later *Mímánsá*, enumerate six.† It does not appear, that a greater number has been alleged by any sect of Indian philosophy.

The first six lectures of JAIMINI'S *Mímánsá* treat of positive injunction: it is the first half of the work. The latter half, comprising six more lectures, concerns indirect command; adapting to a copy, with any requisite modifications, that which was prescribed for the pattern or prototype.

The authority of enjoined duty is the topic of the first lecture: its differences and varieties, its parts (or appendant members, contrasted with the main act), and the purpose of performance, are successively considered in the three next, and complete the subject of "that which is to be performed." The order of performance occupies the fifth lecture; and qualification for its performance is treated in the sixth.

The subject of indirect precept is opened in the seventh lecture generally, and in the eighth particularly. Inferrible changes, adapting to the variation or copy what was designed for the type or model, are discussed in the ninth, and bars or exceptions in the tenth. Concurrent efficacy is considered in the eleventh lecture; and co-ordinate effect in the twelfth: that is, the co-operation of several acts for a single result is the subject of the one; and the incidental effect of an act, of which the chief purpose is different, is discussed in the other.

These, which are the principal topics of each lecture, are not, however, exclusive. Other matters are introduced by the way, being suggested by the main subject or its exceptions.

In the first chapter of the first lecture occurs the noted disquisition of the *Mímánsá* on the original and perpetual association of articulate sound with sense.‡

"It is a primary and natural connexion," JAIMINI affirms, "not merely a conventional one. The knowledge of it is instruction, since the utterance of a particular sound conveys knowledge, as its enunciation is for a parti-

* Page 95-96.

† *Véd. Síchám.*

‡ A passage cited by writers on the dialectic *Nyáya* from the disquisition on the perpetuity of sound (see page 115), is not to be found in JAIMINI'S *sútras*: it must have been taken from one of his commentators.

“ cular sense. It matters not whether the subject have been previously
 “ apprehended (the words being intelligible, or the context rendering
 “ them so). Precept is authoritative, independently of human communi-
 “ cation.”*

Grammarians assume a special category, denominated *sphóta*, for the object of mental perception, which ensues upon the hearing of an articulate sound, and which they consider to be distinct from the elements or component letters of the word. Logicians disallow that as a needless assumption.† They insist, however, that “ sound is an effect, because it is perceived as
 “ the result of effort ; because it endures not, but ceases so soon as uttered ;
 “ because it is spoken of as made or done ; because it is at once apprehend-
 “ ed in divers places at the same instant, uttered by divers persons ; because
 “ it is liable to permutation ; and because it is subject to increase of intensity
 “ with the multitude of utterers.” To all which the answer is, that “ the
 “ result of an effort is uniform, the same letters being articulated. Sound
 “ is unobserved though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air
 “ emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by
 “ their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the ear ;
 “ for want of such appulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended).‡
 “ Sound is not made or done, but is used : it is uttered, not called into
 “ existence. Its universality is as that of the sun (common to all). The
 “ permutation of letters is the substitution of a different one (as a semi-
 “ vowel for a vowel), not the alteration of the same letter. Noise, not
 “ sound, is increased by a multitude of voices. Sound is perpetual, intended
 “ for the apprehension of others : it is universal, a generic term being
 “ applicable to all individuals. Its perpetuity is intimated by a passage
 “ of the *véda*, which expresses ‘Send forth praise, with perpetual
 “ speech.’”§

The first chapter terminates with an inquiry into the authority of the *véda*, which is maintained to be primeval and superhuman ; although different portions of it are denominated from names of men, as *Cát'haca*, *Cau'harma*, *Paishpala*, &c., and although worldly incidents and occurrences are mentioned. Those denominations of particular portions, it is affirmed, have reference to the tradition by which a revelation has been trans-

* *Jaim.* 1. 1. 5. † *Díd'h*, *Párt'h*. and *Mádh*. ‡ *Díd'h*. § *Jaim.* 1. 1. 6. 1-18 and Com.

mitted. They are named after the person who uttered them, as to him revealed.

The eternity of the *vēda*, or authenticity of its revelation, is attempted to be proved by showing that it had no human origin ; and, for this purpose, the principal argument is, that no human author is remembered. In the case of human compositions, it is said, contemporaries have been aware that the authors of them were occupied in composing those works : not so with the *vēda*, which has been handed down as primeval, and of which no mortal author was known.

It is, however, acknowledged, that a mistake may be made, and the work of a human author may be erroneously received as a part of the sacred book by those who are unacquainted with its true origin. An instance occurs among those who use the *Bahvr̥ch*, a *śác'há* of the *R̥gvéda*, by whom a ritual of *Aśwaláyana* has been admitted, under the title of the fifth *Araṇ-yaca*, as a part of the *R̥gvéda*.

The *vēda* received as holy by orthodox Hindus consists of two parts, prayer and precept (*mantra* and *bráhmāna*). *Jaimini* has attempted to give a short definition of the first, adding that the second is its supplement ; “ whatever is not *mantra*, is *bráhmāna*.”* The ancient scholiast has endeavoured to supply the acknowledged defect of *Jaimini*’s imperfect definition, by enumerating the various descriptions of passages coming under each head. Later scholiasts have shown, that every article in that enumeration is subject to exceptions ; and the only test of distinction, finally acknowledged, is admission of the expert, or acceptance of approved teachers, who have taught their disciples to use one passage as a prayer, and to read another as a precept. *Jaimini*’s definition, and his scholiast’s enumeration, serve but to alleviate “ the task of picking up grains.”

Generally, then, a *mantra* is a prayer, invocation, or declaration. It is expressed in the first person, or is addressed in the second. It declares the purpose of a pious act, or lauds or invokes the object. It asks a question or returns an answer : directs, inquires, or deliberates ; blesses or imprecates, exults or laments, counts or narrates, &c.

Here it is to be remarked, that changes introduced into a prayer to adapt

* *Mīm.* 2. 1. 7.

it (*mutatis mutandis*) to a different ceremony from that for which primarily it was intended, or the insertion of an individual's personal and family names where this is requisite, are not considered to be part of the *mantra*.

It is likewise to be observed, although *mantras* of the *védas* are ordinarily significant, that the chants of the *Sāmaveda* are unmeaning. They consist of a few syllables, as *irá áyirá*, or *girá gáyirá*, repeated again and again, as required by the tune or rhythm. Nevertheless, significant *mantras* are likewise chanted; and two of the books of the *Sāmaveda* are allotted to hymns of this description. The hymns consist of triplets (*trich*) or triple stanzas.

The first, or pattern verse or stanza, is found, with the name of the appropriate tune, in the *Chhandas* or *Yóni-grant'ha*; and the two remaining verses or stanzas, to complete the triplet, are furnished in the supplementary book called *Uttara-grant'ha*.

Mantras are distinguished under three designations. Those which are in metre are termed *rich*, those chanted are *sáman*, and the rest are *yajush*, sacrificial prayers in prose (for *yajush* imports sacrifice). Nevertheless, metrical prayers occur in the *Yajurveda*, and prose in the *Sāmaveda*.

The metrical prayers are recited aloud: those termed *sáman* with musical modulation; but the prose inaudibly muttered.* Such, however, as are vocative, addressed to a second person, are to be uttered audibly, though in prose: for communication is intended.†

Metrical prayers, however, belonging to the *Yajurveda* are inaudibly recited; and so are chants belonging to the same inaudibly chanted: for prayers take the character of the rite into which they are introduced; and where the same rite is ordained in more than one *véda*, it appertains to that with which it is most consonant, and the prayer is either audibly or inaudibly chanted accordingly.‡

The prayers termed *rich* and *sáman* are limited by the metre and the chant respectively; but those which are in prose are regulated as to their extent by the sense. A complete sentence constitutes a single *yajush*: the sense must be one, and would be deficient were the phrase divided. Nevertheless, the sentence which constitutes a prayer may borrow from a pre-

* *Mim.* 3. 3. 1.† *Ib.* 2. 1. 7-14.‡ *Ib.* 3. 3. 1-3. See Note B.

ceding or from a subsequent one, terms wanting to perfect the sense, unless an intervening one be incompatible with that construction.*

The *bráhmana* of the *véda* is in general a precept; or it expresses praise or blame, or a doubt, a reason, or a comparison; or intimates a derivation; or narrates a fact or an occurrence: and a characteristic sign of it is that it very generally contains the particle “so” (*iti* or *itiha*); as a *mantra* usually does the pronoun of the second person “thee,” either expressed or understood “(thou) art.”†

In a still more general view the *bráhmana* is practical, directing religious observances, teaching the purpose, time, and manner of performing them, indicating the prayers to be employed, and elucidating their import. The esoteric *bráhmana* comprises the *upanishads*, and is theological.

It becomes a question which the *Mímánsá* examines at much length, whether those passages of the *véda* which are not direct precepts, but are narrative, laudatory, or explanatory, are nevertheless cogent for a point of duty. In this inquiry is involved the further question, whether a consciousness of the scope of an act is essential to its efficacy for the production of its proper consequence. The *Mímánsá* maintains that narrative or indicative texts are proof of duty, as concurrent in import with a direct precept. There subsists a mutual relation between them. One enjoins or forbids an act; the other supplies an inducement for doing it or for refraining from it: “Do so, because such is the fruit.” The imperative sentence is nevertheless cogent independently of the affirmative one, and needs not its support. The indicative phrase is cogent, implying injunction by pronouncing benefit.

It virtually prescribes the act which it recommends.‡ Inference, however, is not to be strained. It is not equally convincing as actual perception: a forthcoming injunction or direct precept has more force than a mere inference from premises.||

A prayer, too, carries authority, as evidence of a precept bearing the like import. This is a visible or temporal purpose of a prayer; and it is a received maxim, that a perceptible purpose being assignable, prevails before an imperceptible one. But the recital of a particular prayer at a religious rite, rather than a narrative text of like import, is for a spiritual end, since there is no visible purpose of a set form of words.§

* *Mím.* 2. 1. 14—18.

† *Śab.* &c. on *Mím.* 1. 4. 1. and 2. 1. 7.

‡ *Mím.* 1. 2. 1—3.

|| *Ib.* 1. 2. 3.

§ *Ib.* 1. 2. 4.

Besides the evidence of precept from an extant revelation or recorded hearing (*śruti*) of it, another source of evidence is founded on the recollections (*smṛiti*) of ancient sages. They possess authority as grounded on the *vēda*, being composed by holy personages conversant with its contents. Nor was it superfluous to compose anew what was there to be found; for a compilation, exhibiting in a succinct form that which is scattered through the *vēda*, has its use. Nor are the prayers which the *smṛiti* directs unauthorized, for they are presumed to have been taken from passages of revelation not now forthcoming. Those recollections have come down by unbroken tradition to this day, admitted by the virtuous of the three tribes, and known under the title of *Dharma-śāstra*, comprising the institutes of law, civil and religious. Nor is error to be presumed which had not, until now, been detected. An express text of the *vēda*, as the *Mīmāṃsā* maintains,* must then be concluded to have been actually seen by the venerable author of a recorded recollection (*smṛiti*).

But if contradiction appear, if it can be shown that an extant passage of the *vēda* is inconsistent with one of the *smṛiti*, it invalidates that presumption. An actual text, present to the sense, prevails before a presumptive one.†

Or though no contrary passage of the *vēda* be actually found, yet if cupidity, or other exceptionable motive may be assigned, revelation is not to be presumed in the instance, the recollection being thus impeached.‡

The *Śākyas* (or *Bauddhas*) and *Jainas* (or *Arhats*), as CUMĀRILA acknowledges, are considered to be *Cshatriyas*. It is not to be concluded, he says, that their *recollections* were founded upon a *vēda* which is now lost. There can be no inference of a foundation in *revelation*, for unauthentic recollections of persons who deny its authenticity. Even when they do concur with it, as recommending charitable gifts and enjoining veracity, chastity, and innocence, the books of the *Śākyas* are of no authority for the virtues which they inculcate. Duties are not taken from them: the association would suggest a surmise of vice,§ tainting what else is virtuous. The entire *vēda*, which is directed to be studied, is the foundation of duty; and those only, who are conversant with it, are capable of competent *recollections*.

* *Mīm.* 1. 3. 1.

† *Ib.* 1. 3. 2.

‡ *Ib.* 1. 3. 3.

§ *Ib.* 1. 3. 4.

Usage generally prevalent among good men, and by them practised as understanding it to be enjoined and therefore incumbent on them, is mediately, but not directly, evidence of duty: but it is not valid if it be contrary to an express text. From the modern prevalence of any usage, there arises a presumption of a correspondent injunction by a holy personage, who remembered a revelation to the same effect. Thus usage presumes a *recollection*, which again presupposes *revelation*. Authors, however, have omitted particulars, sanctioning good customs in general terms: but any usage which is inconsistent with a recorded *recollection* is not to be practised, so long as no express text of scripture is found to support it.

In like manner, rituals which teach the proper mode of celebrating religious rites, and are entitled *Calpa-sûtra* or *Grihya-granṭha*, derive their authority, like the *Dharma-śāstra*, from a presumption that their authors, being persons conversant with the *vēda*, collected and abridged rules which they there found. The *Calpa-sûtras* neither are a part of the *vēda*, nor possess equal nor independent authority. It would be a laborious enterprise to prove a superhuman origin of them; nor can it be accomplished, since contemporaries were aware of the authors being occupied with the composition of them.* Whenever a *sûtra* (whether of the *calpa* or *grihya*) is opposed to an extant passage of the *vēda*, or is inconsistent with valid reason, it is not to be followed: nor is an alternative admissible in regard to its observance in such case, unless a corroborative text of the *vēda* can be shown.†

Neither are usages restricted to particular provinces, though certain customs are more generally prevalent in some places than in others: as the *Hólácá* (vulg. *Hūlī*) or festival of spring, in the east; the worship of local tutelary deities hereditarily, by families, in the south; the racing of oxen on the full moon of *Jyēshṭha*, in the north; and the adoration of tribes of deities (*mātrī-gaṇ'a*), in the west. Nor are rituals and law institutes confined to particular classes: though some are followed by certain persons preferably to others; as *VASISHTHA*, by the *Bahvr̥ch śác'há* of the *R̥gvēda*; *GAUTAMA*, by the *Gobhiliya* of the *Sāmavēda*; *SANC'HA* and *LIC'HITA*, by the *Vájasaneyi*; and *APASTAMBA* and *BAUDHÁYANA*, by the *Taittirīya* of the *Yajurvēda*. There is no presumption of a restrictive revelation, but of one of general import. The institutes of law, and rituals of ceremonies, were

* Guru on *Mīm.* 1. 3. 7.

† *C'handa-dēva*.

composed by authors appertaining to particular *śác'hás*, and by them taught to their fellows belonging to the same, and have continued current among the descendants of those to whom they were so taught.

A very curious disquisition occurs in this part of the *Mímánsá*,* on the acceptation of words in correct language and barbaric dialects, and on the use of terms taken from either. Instances alleged are *yava*, signifying in Sanscrit, barley, but in the barbaric tongue, the plant named *priyangu*; *varáha*, in the one a hog, and in the other a cow; *pílu*, a certain tree,† but among barbarians an elephant; *vétasa*, a rattan cane and a citron. The *Mímánsá* concludes, that in such instances of words having two acceptations, that in which it is received by the civilized (*áryas*), or which is countenanced by use in sacred books, is to be preferred to the practice of barbarians (*Mléch'ha*), who are apt to confound words or their meanings.

Concerning these instances, CUMÁRILA remarks that the words have no such acceptation, in any country, as is by the scholiast alleged. He is wrong in regard to one, at least, for *pílu* is evidently the Persian *fíl* or *píl*. Modern vocabularies‡ exhibit the word as a Sanscrit one in the same sense; erroneously, as appears from this disquisition.

Then follows, in CUMÁRILA's *Vártica*, much upon the subject of provincial and barbaric dialects; which, adverting to the age in which he flourished, is interesting, and merits the attention of philologists. He brings examples from the *Andhra* and *Dravida* dialects, and specifies as barbaric tongues the *Párasica*, *Yavana*, *Raumaca*, and *Barbara*, but confesses his imperfect acquaintance with these.

JAIMINI gives an instance of a barbaric term used in the *véda*, viz., *píca*, a black cuckow (*cuculus indicus*); to which his scholiasts add *néma*, half, *támarasa*, a lotus, and *sata* a wooden colander; but without adducing examples of the actual use of them in any of the *védas*. Such terms must be taken in their ordinary acceptation, though barbarous; and the passage quoted from the *véda* where the word *píca* occurs, must be interpreted "sacrifice a black cuckow at night." It will here be remarked, that *píca* corresponds to the Latin *pícus*, and that *ném* answers to the Persic *ním*.

On the other hand, a barbaric word, or a provincial corruption, is not to

* 1. 3. 5.

† The name is in vocabularies assigned to many different trees.

‡ *Jatádharma*, &c.

be employed instead of the proper *Sanscrit* term. Thus *gó* (*gauh*), and not *gáwí*, is the right term for a cow.* Orthography, likewise, is to be carefully attended to; else by writing or reading *aswa* for *áswa* in the directions for the sacrifice of a horse, the injunction would seem to be for the sacrifice of a pauper (*a-swa*, destitute of property).

Generally, words are to be applied in strict conformity with correct grammar. The *Śácyas*, and other heretics, as CUMÁRILA in this place remarks,† do not use *Sanscrit* (they employ *Prácrit*). But *Bráhmanas* should not speak as barbarians. Grammar, which is primeval, has been handed down by tradition. Language is the same in the *védas* and in ordinary discourse, notwithstanding a few deviations: the import of words is generic, though the application of them is specific.

The peculiarities of the dialect of the *véda* are not to be taken for inaccuracies. Thus, *tman* stands for *átman*, self or soul; and *Bráhmanasah* for *Bráhmanáh*, priests; with many other anomalies of the sacred dialect.‡

When the ordinary acceptation of a term is different from that which it bears in an explanatory passage, this latter import prevails in the text likewise, else the precept and its supplement would disagree. Thus *trivrit*, triplet, is specially applied to a hymn comprising three triplets or nine stanzas, which is the peculiar sense it bears in the *védas*.

Again, *charu*, which, in ordinary discourse signifies boiler or cauldron, is in the *védas* an oblation of boiled food, as rice, &c. So *áswabála*, which literally means horse-hair, is a designation of a species of grass (*saccharum spontaneum*) into which it is said the tail of a consecrated horse was once transformed; and of that grass a cushion is made for certain religious rites.

It will be observed, as has been intimated in speaking of the members of an *adhicaraña* in the *Mímánsá*, that a case is proposed, either specified in JAIMINI's text or supplied by his scholiasts. Upon this a doubt or question is raised, and a solution of it is suggested, which is refuted, and a right conclusion established in its stead. The disquisitions of the *Mímánsá* bear, therefore, a certain resemblance to juridical questions; and, in fact, the Hindu law being blended with the religion of the people, the same modes of reasoning are applicable, and are applied to the one as to the other. The logic of the *Mímánsá* is the logic of the law; the rule of interpreta-

* *Várt.* 1. 3. 9.

† *Ib.* 1. 3. 7.

‡ *Mím.* 1. 3. 10.

tion of civil and religious ordinances. Each case is examined and determined upon general principles; and from the cases decided the principles may be collected. A well-ordered arrangement of them would constitute the philosophy of the law: and this is, in truth, what has been attempted in the *Mīmāṃsā*. JAIMINI's arrangement, however, is not philosophical; and I am not acquainted with any elementary work of this school in which a better distribution has been achieved. I shall not here attempt to supply the defect, but confine the sequel of this essay to a few specimens from divers chapters of JAIMINI, after some more remarks on the general scope and manner of the work.

Instances of the application of reasoning, as taught in the *Mīmāṃsā*, to the discussion and determination of juridical questions, may be seen in two treatises on the Law of Inheritance, translated by myself, and as many on Adoption, by a member of this Society, Mr. J. C. C. Sutherland (See *Mitācsharā* on Inheritance, 1. 1. 10, and 1. 9. 11, and 2. 1. 34; *Jīmūta Vāhana*, 11. 5. 16—19. *Datt. Mīm.* on Adoption, 1. 1. 35—41, and 4. 4. 65—66 and 6. 6. 27—31. *Datt. Chand.* 1. 1. 24 and 2. 2. 4).

The subject which most engages attention throughout the *Mīmāṃsā*, recurring at every turn, is the invisible or spiritual operation of an act of merit. The action ceases, yet the consequence does not immediately ensue. A virtue meantime subsists, unseen, but efficacious to connect the consequence with its past and remote cause, and to bring about at a distant period, or in another world, the relative effect.

That unseen virtue is termed *apūrva*, being a relation superinduced, *not before* possessed.

Sacrifice (*yāga*), which, among meritorious works, is the act of religion most inculcated by the *vēdas*, and consequently most discussed in the prior *Mīmāṃsā*, consists in parting with a thing that it may belong to a deity, whom it is intended to propitiate.* Being cast into the fire for that purpose, it is a burnt offering (*hōma*). Four sorts are distinguished: a simple oblation (*ishti*), the immolation of a victim (*paśu*), the presenting of expressed juice of the *sōma* plant (*asclepias acida*), and the burnt-offering above-mentioned.† The object of certain rites is some definite temporal advantage; of others, benefit in another world. Three ceremonies, in particular,

* *Mīm.* 4. 4. 12.† *Ib.* 4. 4. 1.

are types of all the rest : the consecration of a sacrificial fire, the presenting of an oblation, and the preparation of the *sóma*. The oblation which serves as a model for the rest, is that which is offered twice in each month, *vis.* at the full and change of the moon. It is accompanied; more especially at the new moon, with an oblation of whey from new milk. Accordingly, the *Yajurveda* begins with this rite. It comprehends the sending of selected cows to pasture after separating their calves, touching them with a leafy branch of *palása* (*butea frondosa*) cut for the purpose, and subsequently stuck in the ground in front of the apartment containing the sacrificial fire, for a protection of the herd from robbers and beasts of prey : the cows are milked in the evening and again in the morning ; and, from the new milk, whey is then prepared for an oblation.

Concerning this ceremony, with all its details, numerous questions arise, which are resolved in the *Mímánsá* : for instance, the milking of the cows is pronounced to be not a primary or main act, but a subordinate one ; and the parting of the calves from their dams is subsidiary to that subordinate act.* The whey, which in fact is milk modified, is the main object of the whole preparation ; not the curd, which is but incidentally produced, not being sought nor wanted.†

In the fourth chapter of the first book, the author discriminates terms that modify the precept from such as are specific denominations. Several of the instances are not a little curious. Thus it is a question, whether the hawk-sacrifice (*śyēna-yāga*), which is attended with imprecations on a hated foe, be performed by the actual immolation of a bird of that kind. The case is determined by a maxim, that “ a term intimating resemblance is denominative.” *Hawk*, then, is the name of that incantation : “ it pounces on the foe as a falcon on his prey.”‡ So *tongs* is a name for a similar incantation, “ which seizes the enemy from afar as with a pair of tongs ;” and *cow*, for a sacrifice to avert such imprecations.

It is fit to remark in this place, that incantations for destruction of hated foes, though frequent in the *védas* (and modes of performing them, with greater or less solemnity, are there taught), cannot be deemed laudable acts of religion ; on the contrary, they are pronounced to be at least mediately

* *Mím.* 4. 3. 10.

† *Ib.* 4. 1. 9.

‡ *Ib.* 1. 4. 5 and 3. 7. 23.

criminal ; and pains in hell, as for homicide, await the malevolent man who thus practises against the life of his enemy.

Another instance, discussed in the same chapter, is *chitrá*, applied to a sacrifice performed for acquisition of cattle. It is questioned whether the feminine termination, joined to the ordinary signification of the word, indicates a female victim of a *varied* colour. It intends, however, an offering termed *various*, as consisting of no less than six different articles : honey, milk, curds, boiled butter, rice in the husk as well as clean, and water.*

In like manner, *udbhid* is the name of a sacrifice directed to be performed for the like purpose : that is, by a person desirous of possessing cattle. The sense approaches to the etymology of the term : it is a ceremony “by which possession of cattle is, as it were, dug up.” It does not imply that some tool for delving, as a spade or hoe for digging up the earth, is to be actually employed in the ceremony.

A question of considerable interest, as involving the important one concerning property in the soil in India, is discussed in the sixth lecture.† At certain sacrifices, such as that which is called *viswajit*, the votary, for whose benefit the ceremony is performed, is enjoined to bestow all his property on the officiating priests. It is asked whether a paramount sovereign shall give all the land, including pasture-ground, highways, and the site of lakes and ponds ; an universal monarch, the whole earth ; and a subordinate prince, the entire province over which he rules ? To that question the answer is : the monarch has not property in the earth, nor the subordinate prince in the land. By conquest kingly power is obtained, and property in house and field which belonged to the enemy. The maxim of the law, that “the king “is lord of all excepting sacerdotal wealth,” concerns his authority for correction of the wicked and protection of the good. His kingly power is for government of the realm and extirpation of wrong ; and for that purpose he receives taxes from husbandmen, and levies fines from offenders. But right of property is not thereby vested in him ; else he would have property in house and land appertaining to the subjects abiding in his dominions. The earth is not the king’s, but is common to all beings enjoying the fruit of their own labour. It belongs, says JAIMINI, to all alike : therefore,

* *Mím.* 1. 4. 3.

+ *Ib.* 6. 7. 2.

although a gift of a piece of ground to an individual does take place, the whole land cannot be given by a monarch, nor a province by a subordinate prince; but house and field, acquired by purchase and similar means, are liable to gift.*

The case which will be here next cited, will bring to recollection the instance of the Indian *Calanus*,† who accompanied Alexander's army, and burnt himself at Babylon after the manner of his country.

This particular mode of religious suicide by cremation is now obsolete; as that of widows is in some provinces of India, and it may be hoped will become so in the rest, if no injudicious interference by direct prohibition arouse opposition and prevent the growing disuse. Other modes of religious suicide not unfrequently occur; such as drowning, burying alive, falling from a precipice or under the wheels of an idol's car, &c. But they are not founded on the *védas*, as that by burning is.

Self-immolation, in that ancient form of it, is a solemn sacrifice, performed according to rites which the *védas* direct, by a man desirous of passing immediately to heaven without enduring disease. He engages priests, as at other sacrifices, for the various functions requisite to the performance of the rites, being himself the votary for whose benefit the ceremony is undertaken. At a certain stage of it, after wrapping a cloth round a branch of *udumbara* (*ficus glomerata*), which represents a sacrificial stake, and having appointed the priests to complete the ceremony, he chants a solemn hymn, and casts himself on a burning pile wherein his body is consumed. Afterwards, whatever concerns the rite as a sacrificial ceremony, is to be completed by the attendant priests: omitting, however, those matters which specially appertain to the votary, and which, after his death, there is no one competent to perform.‡

In like manner, if the principal die by a natural death, after engaging *Bráhmaṇas* to co-operate with him in the celebration of certain rites requiring the aid of several priests, his body is to be burnt, and his ashes kept to represent him; and the ceremony is completed for his benefit, according to one opinion, but for theirs according to another. The ashes, it is argued, do not perform the ceremony, but the priests do. Being inanimate, the bones cannot fulfil the prescribed duties peculiar to the principal:

* *Śab. Mādḥ.* and *C'handa*, ad locum.

† *Calyána*.

‡ *Mím.* 10. 2. 23.

as utterance of certain prayers, shaving of hair and beard, measure of his stature with a branch of *udumbara*, &c. These and similar functions are not practicable by an inanimate skeleton, and therefore are unavoidably omitted.*

The full complement of persons officiating at a great solemnity is seventeen. This number, as is shown, includes the votary or principal, who is assisted by sixteen priests engaged by him for different offices, which he need not personally discharge. His essential function is the payment of their hire or sacrificial fee.†

They rank in different gradations, and are remunerated proportionably. Four, whose duties are most important, receive the full perquisite; four others are recompensed with a half; the four next with a third; and the four last with a quarter.

On occasions of less solemnity four priests only are engaged, making with the principal five officiating persons. A question is raised, whether the immolator of a victim at the sacrifice of an animal (usually a goat) be a distinct officiating person: the answer is in the negative. No one is specially engaged for immolator independently of other functions; but some one of the party, who has other duties to discharge, slays the victim in the prescribed manner, and is accordingly termed immolator.‡

The victims at some sacrifices are numerous: as many as seventeen at the *vājapēya*, made fast to the same number of stakes; and at an *āśwamed'ha* not fewer than six hundred and nine of all descriptions, tame and wild, terrestrial and aquatic, walking, flying, swimming, and creeping things, distributed among twenty-one stakes and in the intervals between them; the tame made fast to the stakes, and the wild secured in cages, nets, baskets, jars, and hollow canes, and by various other devices. The wild are not to be slain, but at a certain stage of the ceremony let loose. The tame ones, or most of them (chiefly goats), are to be actually immolated.

The various rites are successively performed for each victim; not completed for one before they are commenced for another. But the consecration of the sacrificial stakes is perfected for each in succession, because the votary is required to retain hold of the stake until the consecration of it is done.§

* *Mīm.* 10. 2. 17—20.

† *Ib.* 3. 7. 8—17.

‡ *Ib.* 3. 7. 13.

§ *Ib.* 5. 2. 1—5.

The foregoing instances may suffice to give some idea of the nature of the subjects treated in the *Mīmāṃsā*, and of the way in which they are handled. They have been selected as in themselves curious, rather than as instructive specimens of the manner in which very numerous and varied cases are examined and questions concerning them resolved. The arguments would be tedious, and the reasons of the solution would need much elucidation, and after all would, in general, be uninteresting.

A few examples of the topics investigated, and still fewer of the reasoning applied to them, have therefore been considered as better conveying in a small compass a notion of the multifarious subjects of the *Mīmāṃsā*.

NOTES

TO THE FOREGOING AND SOME PRECEDING ESSAYS.

A. (Page 441.)

ŚABARA SWĀMÍ ĀCHĀRYA is expressly named by ŚĀNCARA in his commentary on the latter *Mīmāṃsā*; (see *Brahma Sūtra*, S. 3. 53;) and there are allusions to CUMĀRILA BHĀṬĪA, if no direct mention of him.

B. (Page 449.)

Instances of the same prayer recurring either word for word, or with very slight variation, in more than one *vēda*, are innumerable. An eminent example is that of the celebrated *gāyatrī*, of which the proper place is in the *Rig-vēda* (3. 4. 10), among hymns of VIŚWĀMITRA. It is, however, repeated in all the *vēdas*, and particularly in the 3d, 22d and 36th chapters of the white *Yajush*. (3, § 35; 22, § 9; and 36, § 3.)

Another notable instance is that of the *Purusha-sucta*, of which a version was given, from a ritual in which it was found cited (*As. Res.* vol. vii, p. 251). It has a place in the *Rig-vēda* (8. 4. 7.) among miscellaneous hymns; and is inserted, with some little variation, among prayers employed at the *purusha-médha*, in the 31st chapter of the white *Yajur-vēda*.

On collation of those two *védas* and their scholia, I find occasion to amend one or two passages in the version of it formerly given : but for this I shall take another opportunity.

That remarkable hymn is in language, metre, and style, very different from the rest of the prayers with which it is associated. It has a decidedly more modern tone ; and must have been composed after the Sanscrit language had been refined, and its grammar and rhythm perfected. The internal evidence which it furnishes, serves to demonstrate the important fact, that the compilation of the *védas*, in their present arrangement, took place after the Sanscrit tongue had advanced, from the rustic and irregular dialect in which the multitude of hymns and prayers of the *véda* was composed, to the polished and sonorous language in which the mythological poems, sacred and prophane (*purānas* and *cāryas*), have been written.

C. (Page 154.)

The inscription at *Hānsi*, of which a copy, taken at Lieut. Col. Tod's instance by a learned native, was presented by him, with a translation made through the medium of the same person's interpretation, has, as it appears, been likewise translated by Capt. E. Fell, and is published, with other translations of inscriptions (by the same distinguished Sanscrit scholar), in the fifteenth volume of *Asiatic Researches*, p. 448.

Feeling great distrust of the diligence and accuracy of natives in decyphering and interpreting ancient inscriptions, I recommended to Col. Tod to abridge his translation, which rested on a native's interpretation, reducing it, as was accordingly done, to a mere summary. Nevertheless a very material discrepancy appears in the versions: one stating the fort of *Āsi* to have been bestowed on HAMMIRA ; the other affirming it to have been presented by PRĪTHVĪ RĀJA to CIRĀṆA in consequence of his (whether the king or his uncle is not clear) having slain HAMMIRA : the term which Col. Tod's interpreter took to signify "considering," being by Capt. Fell translated "having slain." The difference, if I mistake not, turns on the reading of a single letter : one has read मत्वा *matwā*, where the other finds हत्वा *hatwā*. As no fac-simile has been exhibited, it is not at present practicable to determine which of the two is correct. The presumption is no doubt in favour of the accuracy of Capt. Fell, who was an

able and experienced scholar. But an exact copy of the inscription would be an acceptable communication; and the object may be recommended to the attention of any intelligent traveller visiting *Hánsi*.

Mr. Wilson surmises *Hammíra* to be a corruption of *Mír* or *Amír*. (As. Res. xv., p. 466.) The conjecture is probable. Yet *Hammíra* has unquestionably been a name of Hindu chieftains. The sovereign of *Śācambhara* (*Sambher*), who bore that name (As. Res. vol. ix, p. 192, and vol. x, pp. 416 and 418) was, as it would appear, a Hindu.

D. (Page 205.)

It appears from an inscription (a grant on plates of copper) published, with a translation in the fifteenth volume of Asiatic Researches (p. 447), that JAYA-CHANDRA was son of VIJAYA-CHANDRA; and that there has been a mistake in considering VIJAYA-CHANDRA and JAYA-CHAND to be equivalent Sanscrit and Hindi appellations of the same individual. The error originated with the Pandit SERVÓRU TRIVÉDI, who communicated a copy of the inscription noticed in the ninth volume of Asiatic Researches (pp. 400 and 441) as relative to JAYA-CHAND, whom he identified (erroneously, as now appears) with VIJAYA-CHANDRA.

The series of princes who reigned at *Gádhipura* or *Canyacubja*, ancestors of JAYA-CHANDRA, is now completely and accurately determined; and the recovery of the inscription in question (p. 205 of this volume) ceases to be a matter of any interest.

E. (Page 235.)

By some oversight the date of the month has been given wrong: *sudī* instead of *badi*; the increase instead of the wane of the moon. It should be 3d *badi* (dark half).

On a reperusal of the Grant No. 1. (p. 232), it appears probable that the grantee's name was DHANAPÁLA instead of VANAPÁLA. Throughout the inscription the letter *Ṭ* has for the most part the appearance of *Ṡ*, the detached stroke *ṛ* being effaced: and DHANAPÁLA is doubtless the more ordinary name.

The tenour of the three inscriptions, as read and translated, is subjoined in printed characters. This should have accompanied the fac-simile and English version of them.

COPIES of GRANTS found at UJJAYANI.

No. 1.—P. 232.

ओं स्वस्ति ॥ श्री जयोभ्युदयश्च ॥ जयति बौमकेशोऽसौ यः सग्रीय
विभर्ति तां । ऐन्दवी शिरसा लेखां जगद्बीजांकुराकृतिं ॥ तन्वन्तु
वः स्मरारातेः कल्याणमनिशं जटाः कल्पान्तसमयोद्दामतडिद्वलयपिङ्ग-
लाः ॥ परम भट्टारक महाराजाधिराज परमेश्वर श्री उदयादित्य देव
पादानुध्यात परम भट्टारक महाराजाधिराज परमेश्वर श्री नरवर्म्म
देव पादानुध्यात परम भट्टारक महाराजाधिराज परमेश्वर श्री यशो
वर्म्मदेव पादानुध्यात समस्तप्रशस्तोपेतसमधिगतपंचमहाशब्दालंकार
विराजमान महा कुमार श्री लक्ष्मीवर्म्मदेवः ॥ श्री महा द्वादशकमण्डले
श्री राजशासनभोगे सुरासणी सम्बद्ध वडुदयाम तेप्लासुवरर्ष्म प्रासादि
का सम्बद्ध उथवणकयामयोः समभूतिषयिक पट्टकिल जनपदादीन्ब्राह्म
णोत्तरान्बोधयत्यस्तु वः संविदितं ॥ यथा श्रीमद्भारायां महाराजा
धिराज परमेश्वर श्री यशोवर्म्म देवेन श्री विक्रम कालातीत सम्बत्सरै
कनवत्यधिकशतैकादशेषु कार्तिक शुदि अष्टम्यां संजात महाराज श्री
नरवर्म्म देव साम्बत्सरिके तीर्थीम्भोभिः स्नात्वा देव ऋषि मनुष्य पि
तृस्तर्पयित्वा भगवन्तं भवानोपतिं समभ्यर्च्य समोकुशतिलान्नाद्या
हुतिभिर्हिरण्यरेतसं हूत्वा भानवे अर्घ्यं विधाय कपिलां त्रिः प्रदक्षिणी
कृत्य संसारस्यासारतां दृष्ट्वा नलिनोदलगतजललवतरलतरं जीवितं
धनं चावेद्यं । उक्तंच । वाताभ्रविभ्रममिदं वसुधाधिपत्यमापातमात्र
मधुरो विषयोपभोगः । प्राणास्तृणायजलविन्दुसमा नराणां धर्म्मः
सखा परमहो परलोकयाने ॥ एवमाकलय्य अद्रेलवद्भावरि स्थान
विनिर्गत भरद्वाजगोत्राय भरद्वाज आङ्गिरस वार्हस्पत्य त्रिप्रवराय
आश्वलायनशाखिने दाक्षिणायात कणीट ब्राह्मण द्विविद ठक्कुर श्री

महिरस्वामिपौत्र श्री विश्वरूपसुत आवसथिक श्री धनपालाय उपरि
 लिखित वडउद याम उथवणक यामौ सवृक्षमालाकुलौ निधिनिक्षेप
 सहितौ वापी कूप तडागान्वितौ चतुष्कंकटविशुद्धौ चंद्रार्क्यावदुदक
 पूर्वकतया शासनेन प्रदत्तौ । सम्बत्सर शतद्वादशकेषु श्रावण शुदि पंचद
 श्यां सोम ग्रहण पर्वणि श्रीमत्पितृश्रेयोर्थं पुनरेवास्माभिः एतौ यामौ
 उदकपूर्वकतया शासनेन प्रदत्तौ । तदनयोर्ग्रामयोर्निवासि समस्त
 पट्टकिलादिलोकैस्तथा कर्षकैश्च यथोत्पद्यमान करहिरण्य भागभोगादि
 कमाज्ञाश्रवणविधेयैर्भूत्वा सर्वममुष्मै समुपनेतव्यम् । सामान्यं वै
 तत्पुण्यफलं बुद्ध्वा अस्मद्वंशजैरन्यैरपि भाविभूपतिभिः धर्मीदायोयं
 मन्तव्यः पालनीयश्चेति । यतोबहुभिर्बुधैः सुधा भुक्ता राजभिः सगरादिभिः ।
 यस्य यस्य यदा भूमिस्तस्य तस्य तदा फलम् ॥ स्वदत्तां परदत्ताम्वा
 यो हरेत् वसुंधराम् । षष्टि वर्ष सहस्राणि विष्टायां जायते कृमिः ॥
 सर्वानेतान्भाविनः पार्थिवेन्द्रा भूयो भूयो यावते रामभद्रः । सामा
 न्योयंधर्मसे [तुः]

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ओं स्वस्ति श्री जयो भ्युदयश्च ॥ जयति चोमकेशोऽसौ यः सग्रीय
 विभर्ति तां । ऐंदवीं शिरसा लेखां जगद्बीजांकुराकृतिम् ॥ तन्वंतु
 वः स्मरारातेः कल्याणमनिशं जटाः । कल्पान्तसमयोद्दामतडिद्वलय
 पिंगलाः ॥ श्री वर्द्धमानपुर समावासात् परम भट्टारक महाराजाधि
 राज परमेश्वर श्री उदयादित्यदेवपादानुध्यात परम भट्टारक महा
 राजाधिराज परमेश्वर श्री नरवर्म्म देवपादानुध्यात परम भट्टारक
 महाराजाधिराज परमेश्वर श्री यशोवर्म्मदेवपादानुध्यात परम
 भट्टारक महाराजाधिराज परमेश्वर श्रीमञ्जयवर्म्मदेवो विजयोदयो ॥

वटखेटकषड्भृशत्संबद्ध मायमोडक्यामे समस्त राजपुरुषान् ब्राह्म
 णोत्तरान्प्रतिनिवासि पट्टकिल जनपदादौश्च बोधयत्यस्तु वः संविदितं
 यथा । चंद्रपुरी समावासितैरस्माभिः स्नात्वा वरावरगुरुं भगवंतं भवा
 न्नोपतिं समभ्यर्च्य संसारस्यासारतां दृष्ट्वा तथा हि । वाताभ्रविभ्रम
 मिदं वसुधाधिपत्यमापातमात्रमधुरो विषयोपभोगः । प्राणास्तृणाय
 जलविंदुसमा नराणां धर्मः सखा परमहो परलोक्याने ॥ भ्रमत्सं
 सारवल्गायधाराधाराभिमांश्रियं । प्राप्य ये न दद्मस्तेषां पश्चात्तापः
 परं फलम् ॥ इति जगतो विनश्वरं स्वरूपमाकलय्यादृष्टफलमुररी
 कृत्य चंद्रार्क्षविक्षितिसमकालं यावत्परया भुक्त्वा राजब्रह्मपुर्या
 दक्षिणदेशान्तःपाति अद्रियलविदावरोस्थान विनिर्गताय भा
 रद्वाज - - - -

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श्री भोमल देवी सांवत्सरिक कल्पितत्वाद्भुज्यमान देवल पाटका
 हृदल द्वय परिवर्तेन ब्राह्मणमाप्य कीयतदलद्वय सम्बद्धे वीकरिकायाम
 विभाग उभयजन द्वाभ्यां भूनिवर्तेन सप्तदशकोपेतभूहलैकादशक सम्बद्धे
 समस्त उपरि लिखित लघु वैङ्गणपट्टमामस्तथा विष्करिकायामार्द्धश्च
 स्वसीमा तृणद्यति गोचर पर्यन्तः सवृक्षमालाकुलः सहिरण्यभागभोगः
 सोपरिकरः सर्वदायसमेतश्च मातापित्रोरात्मनश्च पुण्ययशोभिवृद्धये
 शासनेनोदकपूर्वकतया प्रदत्तस्तन्मत्वा यथा दीयमान भागभोग कर
 हिरण्यादिकमाज्ञाश्रवणविधेयैर्भूत्वा सर्वमेताभ्यां समुपनेतव्यं ॥ सा
 मान्यं वै तत्पुण्यफलं बुद्ध्यास्मद्वंशजैर्न्यैरपि भाविभोक्तृभिरस्मत्प्रदत्त
 धर्मीदायोयमनुमत्तव्यः पालनीयश्च । उक्तंच ॥ बहुभिर्वसुधा भुक्त्वा
 राजभिः सगरादिभिः । यस्य यस्य यदा भूमिस्तस्य तस्य तदा

फलम् ॥ यानीह दत्तानि पुरा नरेन्द्रैर्द्वीनानि धर्म्मार्थयशस्कराणि नि
 र्म्माल्यवन्ति प्रतिमानि तानि को नाम साधुः पुनराददीत ॥ अस्मत्कुल
 क्रममुदारमुदाहरद्भिरन्यैश्च दानमिदमभ्यनुमोदनीयं १ लक्ष्म्यास्तडिद्वल
 यवुहुदतुंदिलाया दानं फलं परयशः परिपालनं च ॥ सर्वानेतान्भाविनः
 पार्थिवेन्द्रान्भूयो भूयो यावते रामभद्रः १ सामान्योयं धर्म्मसेतुर्नृपाणां
 काले काले पालनीयो भवद्भिः ॥ इति कमलदलांबुविंदुलोलां त्रियमनु
 चिंत्य मनुष्यजीवितं चं सकलमिदमुदाहृतं बहुधा नहि पुरुषैः परको
 त्रयो विलोप्या इति ॥

सम्भवत ११६२ माघवदि३६० पुरोहित ठक्कुर श्री वामन स्वामि
 ठक्कुर श्री पुरुषोत्तमहाप्रधान राजपुत्र श्री देवधर प्रभृतयः ॥

मंगलं महा श्रीः ॥

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स्वहस्तोयं महाराज श्रीमद्यशोवर्म्मदेवस्य

अधि ॥

श्रीः ॥